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This paper investigates the “education-total factor productivity trade-off” in explaining
income per worker differences between sub-Saharan (unlucky) and G7 (lucky) economies.
First, we examine the dynamics of average years of schooling (i.e. education), capital per
worker, income per worker, and total factor productivity (TFP) across sub-Saharan and G7
countries. We confirm that physical capital and education levels partially explain income
per worker differences between lucky and unlucky economies. Second, we undertake a
novel examination of the impact of technology shocks on income per worker, with the
goal of understanding the role of technology variation in causing cross-country income
per worker differences, and as a potential contributor to overall slow growth in the
sub-Saharan region. In a vector autoregressive (VAR) framework, we show that the impact
of “ad hoc” TFP shocks on income per worker is larger in unlucky economies than in lucky
ones. We observe that average TFP volatility in the “unlucky world” is eight times higher
than in the “G7 world”. We argue that the order of magnitude of the impact heavily
depends on the level of the TFP volatility. Last, we suggest that the documented
differences in the amount of physical capital and in the productivity of human capital
between these two regions add conceptual support for the existence of poverty traps for
sub-Saharan Africa.
& 2013 University of Venice. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Income per worker varies substantially across countries around the world, and is attributed by much existing work to
differences in human capital, physical capital, and total factor productivity (TFP) (see Caselli, 2005; Hall and Jones, 1999).
Nevertheless, there is little consensus on the relative importance of each of these baskets of factors, and the role of human
capital in promoting the economic development of a country is particularly widely debated. For example, Pritchett (1996)
argues that data on the growth of years of schooling provide no support at all for the proposition that more rapid rates of
growth in education capital produce greater income growth. He shows that the estimated impact of educational capital
accumulation on a widely accepted growth accounting definition of TFP growth is large, negative, and statistically
significant. That is, as the labor force becomes more educated, total factor productivity declines. He provides three possible
explanations for this counter-intuitive result: (i) perhaps schooling has, on average, created no skills (i.e. no human capital);
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(ii) perhaps the supply of educated people is higher than the demand (iii) perhaps schooling has increased worker
intellectual skills, but an ineffective institutional environment provides little opportunity for workers to use these skills in
value-added activities (i.e. human capital has been badly invested). In showing that education is not a sufficient condition
for growth, Pritchett (1996) does not seek to advance the idea that education is powerless, but instead provides empirical
support for a of focus on complementary reforms in non-educational sectors that can facilitate educational investments to
pay off.
This emphasis also reflects recent empirical findings supporting the weak explanatory power for education alone as a
driver of cross-country income differences. Increasingly, institutions are also conceptualized to play an important role in
mediating links between various forms of human capital (such as education) and country growth. North’s (1990) broad
articulation of institutions as the formal and informal “rules of the game” in a society serves to illustrate their importance.
He argues that by encompassing the structural fabric which shapes interactions between people, institutions incentivize
societies to behave in certain ways, and as such serve as the underlying determinants of economic performance (North,
1994). Relatedly, Hall and Jones (1999) and Caselli (2005) argue that differences in income per worker might have more to
do with differences in social infrastructure across countries, while Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Mauro (1995), and Ehrlich and
Lui (1999) argue that corruption hampers economic growth. Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu et al. (2003) both
demonstrate the importance of an institutional environment in explaining economic growth by showing that countries with
different levels of institutional quality have different economic growth rates.
Other researchers also highlight the complicating role that globalization brings to bear on these dynamics, while the
extent to which education comes into play continues to be debated. Mazur (2000) argues that globalization has dramatically
increased cross-country income differences. Kremer and Maskin (2003) argue that globalization has marginalized the poor
in developing countries and left behind the poorest countries. Clinton (2000), during a session on the Indian parliament,
argues that the poor must invest in education to take advantage of globalization. But, related empirical evidence suggest
that although the average years of schooling both in primary and secondary school sharply increased in several poor
economies over the last 20 years, income inequalities are still high.
Other work focuses more explicitly on technology as the key force behind economic growth. Hall and Jones (1999) show
that differences in physical capital and educational attainment can only partially explain the variation in income per worker.
They find a large amount of variation in the level of the TFP (i.e. Solow residual/technological progress) across countries, and
they also argue that differences in capital accumulation, productivity, and therefore income per worker might be driven by
differences in institutions and government policies, which they call social infrastructure. Caselli (2005) also argues that the
observed differences in the factors employed in production do not totally explain most of the cross-country variation in
income, but claims that human capital measures rather than social infrastructure should account for differences not only in
the quality of schooling, but also in the health status of the population, which has accumulated repercussions for worker
productivity overall.
In the context of the enduring sub-Saharan growth puzzle, a large part of the literature has focused on the role of
institutions and governance as explanatory variables for low economic growth rates, while few works have been devoted to
explicitly studying the dynamics of TFP and its impact on cross-country income per worker. However, technology
differences are clearly also a plausible driver. For instance, Sachs (2001) presents evidence that production technology in
the tropics has lagged behind temperate zone technology in the two critical areas of agriculture and health, and this in turn
opened a substantial income gap between climate zones.
Here, we use a development accounting framework to first examine TFP and human capital differences between lucky
(G7) and unlucky (sub-Saharan) economies. Second, we analyze the impact of TFP uncertainty shocks on per capita
income. Following the growth accounting setup of Hall and Jones (1999) and Caselli (2005), we observe that differences in
physical capital and education between sub-Saharan and G7 economies do not fully explain the huge gap in income per
worker. Not surprisingly, we find evidence that the TFP plays a crucial role in understanding the existence of a cross-
country income puzzle. Unlucky economies’ average TFP accounts only for 27% of the US TFP. Our empirical findings in the
first part of our analyses confirm existing results on the relationships between physical capital, education levels, and
income (see Hall and Jones, 1999 and Caselli, 2005). To better understand the role of TFP in this complex puzzle, we
undertake in the second part of the paper a novel examination of the impact of rare events (i.e. TFP uncertainty shocks)—
defined as those with TFP growth rate more than 1.43 standard deviations above (below) the Hodrick–Prescott detrended
mean of the TFP growth rate series- on income per worker, with the goal of understanding the key role played by
technology variation in causing cross-country income differences, and as a potential contributor to overall slow growth in
the sub-Saharan region.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3, at the country level, in a growth accounting
framework, determines the income per worker, education and technological progress, and examines the impact of TFP
uncertainty shocks on income per worker. Section 4 discusses the link between our empirical findings, conventional
theoretical economic results and poverty in sub-Saharan countries. Section 5 concludes.
2. Data description and preliminary analysis
In 2010, the thirty-two sub-Saharan countries on which we focus on had a combined population of 516 million and an
average annual per capita income of $3270.00 (i.e. $9 per day). For comparison purposes, we use the G7 economies as
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benchmark. The complete list of countries is presented in Table 2.1. In 2010, the G7 had a population of 735 million an
average annual per capita income of $35,278.00 (i.e. $98 per day). Average savings to GDP ratios over the sample 1980–2011
are 14.87% and 20.69% for the sub-Saharan and G7 countries, respectively. Data are from the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and include all countries listed in Table 2.1.1
The relevant macro-variables (i.e. time series) in this paper are obtained using the empirical procedure developed
by Hall and Jones (1999), and Caselli (2005). We assume that output Y is produced according to the following production
function
Y ¼ AKαðLhÞ1−α ð2:1Þ
where K is the aggregate capital stock and Lh is the quality adjusted workforce, namely the number of workers L multiplied
by the average human capital h and A corresponds to the TFP. Throughout the paper we use the terms total factor
productivity, Solow’s residual, or technological progress interchangeably. In per worker terms the production function can
be written as follows:
Y ¼ Ak
α
h
1−α
ð2:2Þ
where k is the capital labor ratio.
As investigated by Hall and Jones (1999), and by Caselli (2005), we are initially interested in studying how much of the
cross-country income gap can be explained by each specific production factor (i.e. A, h and k). To address the issue, we use
the following set of info: (i) output/income per worker (i.e. y); (ii) capital labor ratio (i.e. k); (iii) total average years of
schooling (i.e. h); (iv) value for the capital share α.
Our dataset combines variables from two sources. The first is version 7.0 of the PENN WORLD TABLES.2 From PENN
TABLES, we extract output, capital and the number of workers. The second is the Barro–Lee educational attainment dataset.
The latter is used to find data on the average years of schooling.3 Data run from 1950 (or later) to 2009.4 The variable y is
measured from PWT63 as real GDP per worker in international dollars (i.e. in PPP, this variable is called rgdpwok in the
original data set).
The capital stock, K, is computed using the standard perpetual inventory equation
Kt ¼ It þ ð1−δÞKt−1 ð2:3Þ
where It is investment and δ is the depreciation rate (assumed to be equal to 0.06). We compute the investment series as
real aggregate investment in PPP. In practice, I¼ rgdpl% pop% ki, where rgdpl, pop and ki represent the real income per
capita, the population (in thousands) and the investment share of PPP converted GDP per capita at 2005 constant prices
(i.e. investment share in total income), respectively.
We estimate the initial value of capital stock K0 as I0=ðδþ gÞwhere I0 is the value of the investment series in the first year
it is available (i.e. in our dataset the initial investment value ranges from 1950 to 1970), and g represents the average
geometric growth rate for the investment series computed over the first twenty years of available data. To compute k,
we divide K by the number of workers. The latter is obtained as rgdpch &pop/rgdpwok, where rgdpch is real GDP per capita
computed with the chain method.
Table 2.1
Unlucky (sub-Saharan Africa) and Lucky (G7) economies.
Unlucky economies Lucky economies
Benin Gabon Mauritania South Africa Canada
Botswana Gambia Mauritius Sudan France
Burundi Ghana Mozambique Swaziland Germany
Cameroon Kenya Namibia Tanzania Italy
Central African Rep. Lesotho Niger Togo Japan
Congo, Rep. The Liberia Rwanda Uganda United Kingdom
Cote d’Ivoire Malawi Senegal Zambia United States
Dem. Rep. of Congo Mali Sierra Leone Zimbabwe
1 Savings to GDP ratio data for Liberia and Zimbabwe are not available. Per capita GDP per worker are based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) in
current international dollar.
2 The PENN WORLD TABLES time series are publicly available online from https://pwt.sas.upenn.edu.
3 The Barro-Lee educational attainment dataset is publicly available online from http://www.barrolee.com.
4 PENN TABLE starting dates (in parentheses): Benin (1959), Botswana (1960), Burundi (1960), Cameroon (1960), Central Afr. Rep. (1960), Congo (1960),
Cote d'Ivoire (1960), Dem. Rep. of Congo (1950), Gabon (1960), Gambia (1960), Ghana (1955), Kenya (1950), Lesotho (1960), Liberia (1970), Malawi (1954),
Mali (1960), Mauritania (1960), Mauritius (1950), Mozambique (1960), Namibia (1960), Niger (1960), Rwanda (1960), Senegal (1960), Sierra Leone (1961),
South Africa (1950), Sudan (1970), Swaizland (1970), Tanzania (1960), Togo (1960), Uganda (1950), Zambia (1955), Zimbabwe (1954), Canada (1950), France
(1950), Germany (1970), Italy (1950), Japan (1950), UK (1950) and USA (1950).
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To construct the human capital series, h, we use the average years of schooling in the population over 25 years old
from the Barro–Lee educational attainment dataset. As in Hall and Jones (1999), the human capital, h, is computed as
follows:
h¼ eθðsÞ ð2:4Þ
where s, which is observed in the data every five years, is the average years of schooling, and θðsÞis piecewise linear
function.5,6 The last parameter to be determined is α. As suggested by literature, we assume capital share to be 1/3. The TFP
(i.e. A) is obtained as residual of Eq. (2.2). Formally,
A¼
y
k
α
h
1−α
: ð2:5Þ
In this paper, we also construct country-by-country ad hoc TFP shock series, which we then use to examine the
relationship between changes in technology and economic growth. To measure shocks, we use an indicator series that takes
a value of 1, once an “extraordinary event”, either positive or negative, occurs, and a value of 0, otherwise. An extraordinary
event is defined as that with TFP growth rate more (less) than 1.43 standard-deviations above (below) the Hodrick–Prescott
detrended mean of the TFP growth rate series (see Bloom, 2009; Cazzavillan and Donadelli, 2013). Formally, a 1 is assigned if
the rate of growth of A is below or above the following thresholds
TFP Shockt ¼ μ
hp
t 71:43sA ð2:6Þ
where μhpt represents the mean of the Hodrick–Prescott filtered TFP growth rate series and sA is the standard deviation of
the TFP growth rate.
To study the contribution of each production input to income, we employ the log version of Eq. (2.2). Formally,
logðyÞ ¼ logðAÞ þ αlogðkÞ þ ð1−αÞlogðhÞ: ð2:7Þ
Results are reported in Table 2.2, and suggest that income is mostly determined by physical capital (i.e.αlog ðkÞ) and
technological factors (i.e. log ðAÞ), while educational attainment plays a less important role. Over the 32 sub-Saharan countries in
our dataset, the quantity ð1−αÞlog ðhÞ=log ðyÞ is on average equal to 3.18%. The average contribution of capital per worker and TFP
to income is equal to 55.28% and 41.54%, respectively. Similar results are obtained for the G7 economies. Human capital, here
captured by the average years of schooling, appears to contribute only marginally to the income per worker, and is perhaps
suggestive of the existence of institutional or related barriers that prevent countries with more highly educated workers in sub-
Saharan Africa from utilizing those skills inways that translate into higher growth. Alternatively, it is also possible that the benefits
of increased educational skills operate under a threshold effect, with the generally low levels of education across all countries on
the continent yet to reach that threshold (even for countries with higher educational attainment than their peers). The
preliminary results of Table 2.2 pave the way to study separately the contribution of the income per worker, human capital and
TFP in solving the cross-country income differences puzzle, as well as to examine the impact of variation (i.e. uncertainty shocks)
in the level of technology on the income per worker.
3. Cross-country income differences: An empirical review
3.1. Income, education and TFP: Some stylized facts
Hall and Jones (1999) find a large amount of variation in the level of the Solow residual (TFP) across countries. Their main
hypothesis is that differences in capital accumulation, productivity, and therefore income per worker are fundamentally related
to differences in social infrastructure, that is, institutions, across countries. Caselli (2005), using the benchmark Hall and Jones’
(1999) production function, argues that only a small fraction of cross-country income variance can be attributed to differences in
(physical and human) capital. In particular, he finds that the fraction of the variance of income explained by such observed
endowments is equal to 0.39.7 This implies that a large portion of the variance is explained by TFP (Solow’s residual). This
empirical consistency supports our curiosity to investigate the impact of TFP shocks on per capita income, in order to better
understand the role of technology changes in promoting economic growth and development in sub-Saharan Africa.
In Table 3.1, we report the summary statistics of the population, income per worker, education level and physical capital
per worker. All time series are obtained following the procedure described in Section 2. In addition, we report the average
values of the growth rate of the population and capital per worker, as well as the variance of the TFP growth rate. Statistics
are computed on a country-by-country basis. Columns three, four and six of Table 3.1 confirm Hall and Jones’ (1999) main
results, in that they show that the average growth rate of income per worker is lower across unlucky economies than across
lucky economies (i.e. 1.060% vs 2.280%). Results also show that the sub-Saharan average capital stock is one-tenth of the
5 The structure of the piecewise linear function θðsÞ: θðsÞ ¼ 0:134⋅sif s≤4, θðsÞ ¼ 0:134% 4þ 0:101% ðs−4Þif 4os≤8 and θðsÞ ¼ 0:134% 4þ 0:101% 4þ
0:068% ðs−8Þ if s48.
6 Caselli (2005) justifies the low frequency in the average years of schooling dataset as follows: “since s moves slowly over time, a quinquennial
observation can plausibly be employed for nearby dates as well”.
7 Formally, Caselli (2005) uses the following measure of success: succes1 ¼ var½log ðyhkÞ(=var½log ðyÞ( where yhk ¼ k
α
h
1−α
, and refers to yhk as the factor-
only model.
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stock of capital averaged across the G7 economies. The average capital per worker and the average TFP growth rate in the
unlucky world are 2.339% and −0.053%, respectively. In the lucky world, we get the following values: 3.381% and 0.686%,
respectively. In contrast to the standard neoclassical growth theory, our findings suggest that economies with low level of
capital tend to grow at a lower rate and accumulate a low amount of capital through time.
We also observe that there is substantial heterogeneity in these summary statistics within the sub-Saharan zone. For
example, the income per worker ranges from $728.57 (Burundi) to $23,066.90 (Gabon), and the capital per worker ranges
from $75,800.33 (Burundi) to $7436,666.28 (Gabon). However, the gap with the G7 economies is still significantly high, and
only one sub-Saharan economy in our dataset (Gabon) seems to show income and capital outcomes on par with those of G7
economies. The income per worker interval goes from a min of $ 38,014.08 (Japan) to a max of $ 56,281.49 (USA); and goes
from a min of $6932,284.44 (UK) to a max of $15,704,562.07 (Germany) for the capital per worker.8 Average years of
schooling min–max intervals are: [0.02 (Mozambique)−5.68 (South Africa)] and [6.36 (France)−11.14 (U.S.)].
We summarize our empirical findings as follows: (i) the absolute convergence theory, suggested by the neoclassical
growth theory, does not apply;9 (ii) the rate of growth of the technological progress across unlucky economies is on average
Table 2.2
The elements of this table represent the average contribution of each input to total income per worker (numbers are expressed in percentage points).
According to data availability, mean values might be computed using a different number of years. Series are annually and run from 1950 to 2009.
Source: PENN WORLD Tables, Barro–Lee dataset.
Country αlog ðkÞ
log ðyÞ
ð1−αÞlog ðhÞ
log ðyÞ
log ðAÞ
log ðyÞ
Sub-Saharan Africa
Benin 56.81 1.94 41.25
Botswana 53.41 4.17 42.42
Burundi 56.43 2.11 41.46
Cameroon 53.32 3.43 43.26
Central African Republic 56.01 2.30 41.69
Congo, Republic The 55.81 4.01 40.19
Cote d’Ivoire 52.25 2.49 45.27
Democratic Republic of Congo 56.92 2.41 40.67
Gabon 52.49 3.31 44.20
Gambia 53.11 1.67 45.23
Ghana 60.81 4.73 34.46
Kenya 55.22 3.96 40.82
Lesotho 55.11 4.92 39.97
Liberia 60.72 3.19 36.09
Malawi 61.79 2.80 35.41
Mali 55.66 0.81 43.53
Mauritania 57.20 2.70 40.09
Mauritius 54.56 4.60 40.85
Mozambique 56.04 1.35 42.61
Namibia 52.92 4.39 42.68
Niger 55.86 0.98 43.16
Rwanda 53.18 2.31 44.52
Senegal 53.50 3.38 43.12
Sierra Leone 53.66 2.07 44.27
South Africa 52.07 4.79 43.14
Sudan 49.53 1.97 48.50
Swaziland 53.29 4.87 41.84
Tanzania 56.69 4.05 39.27
Togo 56.44 3.21 40.35
Uganda 54.61 2.92 42.47
Zambia 54.73 4.29 40.98
Zimbabwe 58.94 5.61 35.46
Advanced economies
Canada 49.47 6.46 44.07
France 50.02 4.76 45.22
Germany 50.80 5.33 43.87
Italy 50.58 4.91 44.51
Japan 50.61 6.25 43.14
United Kingdom 49.01 5.57 45.43
United States 49.45 7.03 43.52
Mean (32 sub-Saharan) 55.28 3.18 41.54
Mean (7 Developed) 49.99 5.76 44.25
8 The minimum and maximum values are country specific sample averages. Data run from 1950 or later to 2009.
9 A detailed discussion is provided in Section 4.
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negative (i.e. −0.053%);10 (iii) the average rate of growth of capital per worker is negative in 6 out of 32 unlucky economies
(i.e. lack in capital accumulation); (iv) on average, the stock of capital per worker across lucky economies is ten times higher
than across unlucky economies.
Our numbers also support past empirical findings stating that differences in physical capital and in educational attainment
explain only a small fraction of the differences in income per worker across countries (see Caselli, 2005; Hall and Jones, 1999
among others). In Table 3.2, we report country-by-country empirical counterparts of Eq. (2.2). In particular, we weight the average
production input of each sub-Saharan and G7 economy i over the average production component of the US. Formally,
ywi ¼
yi
yUS
; k
w
i ¼
k
α
i
k
α
US
; h
w
i ¼
h
1−α
i
h
1−α
US
; Awi ¼
Ai
AUS
: ð3:1:1Þ
Table 3.1
The elements of this table represent the mean values of the rate of growth of the population (pop), output per worker (yt), capital per worker (ktð%Þ), the
human capital (ht) and Solow’s residual (A). The 6th column represents the mean of the stock of capital per worker (measured in millions of US dollars).
The last column displays the variance of the TFP growth rate (s2A). Numbers are all expressed in percentage points. Data run from 1950 (or later) to 2009.
Sources: PENN WORLD Tables, Barro–Lee dataset.
Country Pop. y k h k (per capita) A Var(A)
Sub-Saharan Africa
Benin 2.854 1.150 1.101 1.579 580,529.9 0.225 0.277
Botswana 2.636 6.508 11.208 4.290 2,722,750.3 1.697 0.752
Burundi 2.399 0.895 2.537 1.400 75,800.3 −0.331 0.580
Cameroon 2.319 1.143 3.780 2.963 785,174.8 −0.869 0.278
Central African Republic 2.273 −0.764 −2.562 1.680 296,073.1 −0.439 0.216
Congo, Republic The 2.716 2.213 −0.437 3.513 1,125,737.8 1.605 0.636
Cote d’Ivoire 3.410 0.700 1.170 2.084 431,322.5 −0.252 0.237
Democratic Republic of Congo 2.797 −1.179 −0.886 1.924 296,502.5 −1.334 1.536
Gabon 2.227 2.298 2.344 3.509 7,436,666.3 0.419 0.683
Gambia 3.173 1.256 4.435 1.276 194,579.3 −0.664 0.455
Ghana 2.591 2.008 −1.164 4.052 1,087,550.4 1.537 1.326
Kenya 3.190 0.379 −0.004 3.732 430,677.6 −0.375 0.244
Lesotho 1.657 2.784 12.666 4.058 494,800.0 −1.418 0.538
Liberia 2.585 −1.470 −4.900 1.995 993,403.5 −0.279 5.415
Malawi 2.886 2.477 3.711 2.207 648,237.1 0.654 0.971
Mali 2.220 −3.418 3.912 0.641 395,543.5 0.097 0.379
Mauritania 1.945 2.407 1.770 2.311 1,021,951.2 1.383 0.873
Mauritius 1.681 1.727 1.176 5.138 3,594,133.1 0.720 0.338
Mozambique 2.160 1.837 3.414 0.022 99,453.8 0.627 0.231
Namibia 2.604 1.104 2.028 4.569 3,497,271.6 −0.063 0.253
Niger 2.677 −0.083 1.930 0.759 354,120.5 −0.919 0.418
Rwanda 2.642 1.304 3.419 1.677 144,542.2 −0.345 1.666
Senegal 2.601 0.242 2.710 2.858 406,108.6 −1.139 0.202
Sierra Leone 1.558 1.204 4.485 1.559 247,637.8 −0.611 0.598
South Africa 2.201 1.149 1.577 5.684 4,255,861.4 0.188 0.109
Sudan 2.875 1.545 3.368 1.447 304,383.5 −0.010 0.924
Swaziland 2.705 2.779 2.820 4.081 1,719,355.8 0.957 0.675
Tanzania 2.825 0.096 4.103 3.107 232,829.8 0.096 0.181
Togo 2.928 −0.055 1.949 2.533 621,269.6 −1.479 0.404
Uganda 3.044 1.370 2.413 2.519 171,091.1 −0.005 0.249
Zambia 2.806 0.826 0.035 4.007 844,676.3 0.136 0.790
Zimbabwe 2.384 −0.512 0.743 4.353 127,199.8 −1.501 0.886
Advanced economies
Canada 1.490 1.401 2.118 9.568 9,362,137.2 0.333 0.053
France 0.707 2.588 3.671 6.361 9,739,378.0 0.810 0.066
Germany 0.306 1.359 0.669 6.769 15,704,562.1 0.201 0.100
Italy 0.424 3.240 4.400 6.535 11,348,080.5 1.275 0.057
Japan 0.709 3.850 6.960 9.064 10,997,926.0 1.287 0.308
United Kingdom 0.361 1.871 3.778 7.604 6,932,284.4 0.283 0.039
United States 1.196 1.649 2.068 11.139 11,241,901.5 0.614 0.063
Mean(32 sub-Saharan) 2.549 1.060 2.339 2.735 1,113,663.6 −0.053 0.729
Sd (32 sub-Saharan) 0.444 1.673 3.279 1.397 ... 0.895 0.941
Mean (7 Advanced) 0.742 2.280 3.381 8.149 10,760,895.7 0.686 0.098
Sd (7 Advanced) 0.448 0.972 2.032 1.816 ... 0.457 0.094
10 Negative average TFP growth rates are found in the following sub-Saharan countries: Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire,
Dem. Rep. of Congo, Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Niger, Namibia, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Zimbabwe.
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All bar variables in Eq. (3.1.1) denote average values. Data suggests that, under this benchmark production function,
the TFP plays a crucial role in explaining why sub-Saharan countries are not able to emerge from relative stagnation
into more productive economies. Especially, our findings show that the differences in the level of technology between
unlucky and lucky economies are huge, an in particular, are higher than human and physical capital differences. In fact,
the average sub-Saharan TFP is less than one-third of the U.S. TFP. In contrast, education and capital per worker across
sub-Saharan economies seem to be closer to US education and capital per worker values (i.e. 60% and 40%,
respectively). Results, reported in the second and last column of Table 3.2, are summarized in the relations defined
in Eq. (3.1.2).
k
α
i
k
α
US
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h
1−α
i
h
1−α
US
∪
Ai
AUS
o
h
1−α
i
h
1−α
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ð3:1:2Þ
Hall and Jones (1999) argue that one possible interpretation of this result is that other differences in labor skills are also
important, such as the quality of human capital. These inputs might be considered directly in the production function. They
ultimately claim that a theory of productivity differences is needed.
Table 3.2
The elements of this table are the empirical counterparts to the components of Eq. (2.2), all measured as ratios to the U. S. values. The first column is the
product of the other three columns. Data run from 1950 or later to 2009.
Sources: PENN WORLD Tables, Barro–Lee dataset.
Country Productivity factors: contribution
y k
α
h
1−α A
Advanced economies
United States 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Canada 0.874 0.942 0.931 0.996
France 0.793 0.934 0.776 1.093
Germany 0.948 1.132 0.836 1.002
Italy 0.791 0.974 0.785 1.035
Japan 0.675 0.918 0.892 0.825
United Kingdom 0.760 0.835 0.839 1.084
Sub-Saharan economies
Benin 0.043 0.376 0.541 0.213
Botswana 0.175 0.568 0.697 0.441
Burundi 0.013 0.187 0.533 0.130
Cameroon 0.081 0.405 0.624 0.320
Central African Republic 0.031 0.297 0.551 0.191
Congo, Republic The 0.079 0.470 0.656 0.255
Cote d’Ivoire 0.068 0.338 0.571 0.354
Democratic Republic of Congo 0.034 0.300 0.551 0.204
Gabon 0.410 0.869 0.656 0.719
Gambia 0.035 0.255 0.527 0.257
Ghana 0.036 0.460 0.673 0.116
Kenya 0.045 0.341 0.640 0.205
Lesotho 0.035 0.319 0.674 0.162
Liberia 0.047 0.438 0.586 0.182
Malawi 0.023 0.378 0.569 0.109
Mali 0.038 0.323 0.493 0.241
Mauritania 0.057 0.452 0.577 0.218
Mauritius 0.189 0.687 0.713 0.386
Mozambique 0.016 0.206 0.507 0.154
Namibia 0.231 0.681 0.704 0.482
Niger 0.037 0.318 0.499 0.232
Rwanda 0.029 0.232 0.551 0.225
Senegal 0.054 0.331 0.609 0.267
Sierra Leone 0.039 0.279 0.544 0.254
South Africa 0.309 0.727 0.742 0.572
Sudan 0.085 0.300 0.549 0.514
Swaziland 0.141 0.536 0.722 0.365
Tanzania 0.024 0.273 0.624 0.143
Togo 0.046 0.378 0.600 0.202
Uganda 0.028 0.249 0.578 0.193
Zambia 0.074 0.422 0.663 0.264
Zimbabwe 0.014 0.227 0.677 0.093
Mean (6 Developed) 0.807 0.956 0.843 1.006
Sd (6 Developed) 0.086 0.090 0.055 0.089
Mean (32 Sub-Saharan) 0.080 0.394 0.606 0.271
Sd (32 Sub-Saharan) 0.089 0.161 0.070 0.142
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For example, Parente and Prescott (1994) propose a theory of economic development in which technology adoption and
barriers to such adoptions are the focus. Based on the fact that the size of these barriers differs across countries and time,
they construct a theory where it is shown that the larger these barriers to technology uptake, the greater the investment a
firm must make to adopt a more advanced technology.
These results suggest that additional insights can be gained by conducting an analysis on cross-country income
differences focusing only on the TFP and capital per worker gaps rather than on the education gap. Since cross-country
differences in the level of technology appear to be key, the rest of the paper is devoted to study the impact of variation in the
TFP level on income per worker.
3.2. TFP shocks: Do they matter?
As discussed in Section 3.1, the TFP component emerges as a more important factor than education (i.e. average
years of schooling) in understanding cross-country income per worker differences, as well as in exacerbating output
instability. In this work, we abstract from the political or social instability issues to focus instead, via time series
analysis, on the magnitude of the impact of TFP shocks on income per worker. This is because we posit that the TFP
represents the most important source of the presence of huge income differences between the sub-Saharan Africa and
the advance economies world. We stress that our empirical setup allows us to conduct the analysis on a country-by-
country basis. The TFP shock indicator (i.e. TFP uncertainty shock) series is derived as discussed in Section 2. For each
country we get two series: one collects positive shocks and one collects negative shocks. Shock series appear as 0/1
indicator variables. Our ad hoc shocks (i.e. extraordinary events) are reported, on yearly basis, in Table A.1. Positive or
negative signs – in parentheses – confirm the presence of extreme movements in the TFP growth rate series. In the
spirit of Bloom (2009) and Cazzavillan and Donadelli(2013), we assume that to each extreme event corresponds a
financial, political or social shock. The effects of TFP shocks on income per worker are studied via a vector
autoregressive (VAR) analysis. A standard VAR(p,k) takes the following form
Xt ¼ A1Xt−1 þ⋯ ⋯þ AkXt−k þW t ð3:2:1Þ
where W t)WNð0; ΩÞ. In (3.2.1) Xt is a (p &1) vector of variables and k represents the numbers of lags. To evaluate the
impact of TFP shocks on income per worker, we estimate, at the country level, a set of bivariate VARs. The full set of
variables used in our VAR estimations includes the income per worker growth rate (Δyt) and TFP shock indicator series
(TFPShock). In this framework, the VAR specification in Eq. (3.2.1) can be written as
TFPShockt
Δyt
" #
|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
Xt
¼
a11 a12
a21 a22
" #
|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
A1
TFPShockt−1
Δyt−1
" #
|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
Xt−1
þ
wTFPt
wΔyt
" #
|fflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflffl}
W t
; ð3:2:1Þ
where A1 is the matrix of coefficients and k is assumed to be 1. Our VARs’ estimates are computed using robust
standard errors (i.e. HAC procedure). The optimal number of lags, k, is chosen according to the BIC lag selection criteria.
To compute impulse responses, the 1/0 TFP shock series is ordered last in a Cholesky decomposition. This specification
implies that the second shock does not affect the first variable contemporaneously, but both shock have a
contemporaneous effect on the second variable.
The main result here is that the impact of the ad hoc TFP shock series on income per worker is larger in the unlucky
world rather than in the lucky one. Impulse response functions (IRFs), computed via the estimation of Eq. (3.2.1), are
reported, on a country-by-country basis, in Figs. A.4–A.7. For space reasons, we report IRFs to negative TFP shocks
only.11 IRFs of Mauritania and Swaziland are not reported because they do not display rare events. Clearly, negative
technology shocks have a negative impact on the income per worker growth rate, regardless of G7 or sub-Saharan
economies. But, the impact is much higher in unlucky economies rather than in lucky ones (see vertical axes of Figs.
A.4–A.7). In the unlucky world, the collapse of the per worker income in response to a negative shock ranges from −2%
to −8%, contrasted with −0.1% to −3% in the lucky world. We notice also that for some economies the impact is not
statistically significant, such as in Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sudan and Zambia. Where significant, it lasts on average for 1.5
years. For lucky economies, statistical results are less robust. We argue that the high order of magnitude of the impact
in sub-Saharan economies is mostly driven by the presence of a higher TFP average volatility. Not surprisingly, the
average TFP volatility across unlucky countries is roughly eight times higher than the average volatility computed
across lucky economies (i.e. 0.729% vs 0.098%). This is clear from Figs. A.1–A.3 which plot the TFP growth rate –
computed as in Eq. (2.5) – for the lucky and unlucky economies.
11 Impulse responses to positive TFP shocks are available upon request.
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4. High standards of living in sub-Saharan Africa: A utopia
"Africa is stuck in a poverty trap, too poor to achieve robust, high levels of economic growth and, in many places,
simply too poor to grow at all''
Sachs et al. (2004)
Several basic elements related to sub-Saharan Africa’s protracted puzzle of slow growth and underdevelopment are now
fairly well recognized, even as the pathways to sustained growth remain only hazily understood. Sub-Saharan countries
were long characterized by homogenous and stagnant economic growth rates, only recently showing more robust progress
during the past decade. Recent growth notwithstanding, while the rest of the world has seen overall higher standards of
living during the past three decades, Sub-Saharan economies as a whole got poorer (Table 4.1) (Bayraktara and Fofackb,
2011; The World Bank, 2010). Moreover, recent positive growth in sub-Saharan African countries is also associated with
widening inequality between wealthier and poorer segments of the population (Ndulu et al., 2007), prompting attention to
pro-poor growth strategies as well (Thorbecke, 2013).
While the complex interplay of drivers of sustained growth on this continent remain an enduring conundrum, much of
the recent work around this issue increasingly emphasizes a wider lens beyond the traditional economic factors and various
forms of capital. This shift includes a focus towards the mediating roles of an enabling institutional environment to support
human resource capacity and facilitate technology innovations (Nelson, 2008), improved governance to support trade and
market stability (Levchenko, 2007; Naude and Krugell, 2007; Meyer et al, 2009), and infrastructure investments to smooth
geographic and endowment-linked barriers to economic diversification and trade (Ndulu, 2006).
Sachs et al. (2004) find that the per capita income growth rate in Africa during 1980–2000 is negative, and argue that
African countries have the worst health condition of the planet as well as lowest government stability. Existing empirical
findings also find that most developing countries that were poor in the 1950’s remain so today, and most of these countries
belong to the Sub-Saharan region. Although the existence of poverty traps continues to hold strong conceptual appeal for
sub-Saharan Africa, the empirical evidence demonstrating mechanisms by which countries might move into or remain in
such traps has been less forthcoming (Kraay and Raddatz, 2007). Conceptually, evidence for the existence of poverty traps
can be indicated by a bimodal distribution of per capita income, such as we arguably observe in this analysis (i.e. poorer
countries clustered around the lower poverty trap equilibrium and a richer countries clustered around the higher
equilibrium).12 However, while a bi-modal distribution suggestive of traps is not uncommonly observed across much
existing work, attempts to understand the causal mechanisms, which might lead to such a distribution, have yielded very
little consensus. For instance, using data from microenterprises in Mexico, McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) suggest that the
presence of large fixed costs to run a new business might be the main cause of an economies’ poverty trap. At a more micro-
level, Jalan and Ravallion (2002) argue that the availability of geographical capital (e.g. availability of roads, literacy levels) is
key for sustaining growth. Kraay and Raddatz (2007) focus on both savings and productivity as causal mechanisms which
could serve to generate poverty traps, but find little empirical support for either mechanism to operate in ways that could
produce the particular equilibrium dynamics which underpin such conceptual models. Although an explicit test for
empirical support of a dynamic poverty trap model is beyond the scope of our work here, our empirical results seem to add
support for the existence of low-growth traps, and suggest that a low (or negative) average capital per worker accumulation
as well as a negative TFP growth rate across unlucky economies could represent a mechanism by which countries remain in
such traps.13
5. Conclusion
The roles of education and TFP in helping to explain cross-country income differences have been widely discussed and
documented in the economic growth literature,14 even as very high income inequalities continue to persist between
Table 4.1
Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day (PPP) (% of population). Population below $2 a day is the percentage of the population living on less than $2.00 a day at
2005 international prices. Source: WORLD BANK.
Country Name 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008
East Asia & Pacific 92.4 88.3 81.6 81 75.8 64 61.7 51.9 39 33.2
Europe & Central Asia 8.32 6.68 6.33 6.87 9.18 11.2 12.1 7.92 4.6 2.2
Latin America & Caribbean 23.8 26.8 22.4 22.4 21.7 21 22 22.2 16.7 12.4
Middle East & North Africa 30.1 27.1 26.1 23.5 22.1 22.2 22 19.7 17.4 13.9
South Asia 87.2 85.6 84.5 83.6 82.7 80.7 77.8 77.4 73.4 70.9
Sub-Saharan Africa 72.2 74.7 74.3 76 78.1 77.5 77.4 76.1 74.1 69.2
12 See Azariadis and Stachurski (2004a, b) and Quah (1993, 1996, 1997), among others.
13 For a detailed discussion on the dynamics of the capital accumulation process in poor countries, see Bayraktara and Fofackb (2011), and Sachs et al.
(2004).
14 See Caselli (2005), Hall and Jones (1999), and Sachs (2001), among many others.
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advanced and poor economies. In this relatively simple analysis, we confirm that the TFP (i.e. Solow’s residual) seems
to explain a larger portion of the income gap between Sub-Saharan and G7 economies than education (i.e. average
years of schooling). On average the TFP in the unlucky world accounts only for 27% of the US TFP. Capital and education
account for 39.4% and 60% respectively. Thus, it appears that income inequalities are driven more by differences in
technological progress and physical capital, while education differences account only residually. We show that
negative TFP uncertainty shocks, once they occur, further depress income per worker in the sub-Saharan zone,
conceivably generating a feedback mechanism by which poorer countries continue to grow slowly. The magnitude of
the impulse generated by the shock is on average much higher in the unlucky world than in the lucky one. We argue
that the TFP volatility level affects the order of magnitude of the impact. In other words, the effect of large changes in
the TFP level on a relatively low income per worker growth rate is higher than in an economy with a high income per
worker growth rate. To conclude, we suggest that large differences in capital per worker and very low levels in the
productivity of human capital across these two world regions adds conceptual support for the existence of poverty
traps for Sub-Saharan Africa. Further work to understand how technology accumulation differences and shocks might
mechanistically contribute to trap dynamics could help to elucidate appropriate policy responses for more sustained
economic growth.
Appendix A. On the TFP
See Appendix Figs. A.1–A.7 and Table A.1
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Fig. A.1. The Dynamics of the TFP Growth Rate (a). The TFP is computed as defined in Eq. (2.5). Data run from 1950 (or later) to 2009.
G. Cazzavillan et al. / Research in Economics 67 (2013) 226–242 235
-0.05
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
 0
 0.01
 0.02
 0.03
 0.04
 0.05
 0.06
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
CANADA
-0.1
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
 0
 0.02
 0.04
 0.06
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
FRANCE
-0.12
-0.1
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
 0
 0.02
 0.04
 0.06
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
GERMANY
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
 0
 0.02
 0.04
 0.06
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
ITALY
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
JAPAN
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
 0
 0.02
 0.04
 0.06
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
UK
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
 0
 0.02
 0.04
 0.06
 0.08
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
US
Fig. A.3. The Dynamics of the TFP Growth Rate (c). TFP is computed as defined in Eq. (2.5). Data run from 1950 (or later) to 2009.
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Fig. A.2. The Dynamics of the TFP Growth Rate (b). TFP is computed as defined in Eq. (2.5). Data run from 1950 (or later) to 2009.
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Fig. A.4. Sub-Saharan Economies IRFs: VAR estimation of the impact of 1/0 negative TFP shock indicator on income per worker growth rate. The variable y
is from PWT63 PENN TABLE, and represents the real GDP per worker in international dollars (i.e. in PPP, this variable is called rgdpwok in the original data
set). Standard errors are Newey and West (1987, 1994). Notes: shaded area represents 95% confidence bands around the response to 1/0 negative TFP shock
indicator. From top left: Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Cote d’ Ivoire, Dem. Rep. Congo, Gabon and Gambia. Data
run from 1950 (or later) to 2009.
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Fig. A.5. Sub-Saharan Economies IRFs: VAR estimation of the impact of 1/0 negative TFP shock indicator on income per worker growth rate. The variable y
is from PWT63 PENN TABLE, and represents the real GDP per worker in international dollars (i.e. in PPP, this variable is called rgdpwok in the original data
set). Standard errors are Newey and West (1987, 1994). Notes: shaded area represents 95% confidence bands around the response to 1/0 negative TFP shock
indicator. From top left: Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia and Niger. Data run from 1950 (or later) to 2009.
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Fig. A.6. Sub-Saharan Economies IRFs: VAR estimation of the impact of 1/0 negative TFP shock indicator on income per worker growth rate. The variable
y is from PWT63 PENN TABLE, and represents the real GDP per worker in international dollars (i.e. in PPP, this variable is called rgdpwok in the original data
set). Standard errors are Newey and West (1987, 1994). Notes: shaded area represents 95% confidence bands around the response to 1/0 negative TFP shock
indicator. From top left: Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. Data run from 1950 (or later)
to 2009.
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Fig. A.7. G7 Economies IRFs: VAR estimation of the impact of 1/0 negative TFP shock indicator on income per worker growth rate. The variable y is from
PWT63 PENN TABLE, and represents the real GDP per worker in international dollars (i.e. in PPP, this variable is called rgdpwok in the original data set).
Standard errors are Newey and West (1987, 1994). Notes: shaded area represents 95% confidence bands around the response to 1/0 negative TFP shock
indicator. From top left: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and USA. Data run from 1950 (or later) to 2009.
G. Cazzavillan et al. / Research in Economics 67 (2013) 226–242240
References
Acemoglu, D., Simon, J., Robinson, J., Thaicharoen, Y., 2003. Institutional causes, macroeconomic symptoms: volatility, crises and growth. Journal of
Monetary Economics 50 (1), 49–123.
Azariadis, C. Stachurski, J., 2004a. Poverty Traps. In: Aghion, Durlauf (Eds.), Handbook of Economic Growth.
Azariadis, C. Stachurski, J., 2004b. A Forward Projection of the Cross-country Income Distribution. Manuscript, UCLA.
Bayraktara, N., Fofackb, H., 2011. Capital accumulation in sub-Saharan Africa: income-group and sector differences. Journal of African Economies 20 (4),
531–561.
Bloom, N., 2009. The impact of uncertainty shocks. Econometrica 77 (3), 623–685.
Caselli, F., 2005. Accounting for cross-country income differences. first ed. In: Aghion, Philippe, Durlauf, Steven (Eds.), Handbook of Economic Growth,
vol. 1., Elsevier, pp. 679–741. chapter 9.
Cazzavillan, G. Donadelli, M., 2013. The 2007–2009 Global Demand Collapse: Rare Events and Policy Effectiveness. Unpublished manuscript (〈http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1893382〉).
Clinton, 2000. Address to a Joint Session of the Indian Parliament, March 2000.
Ehrlich, I. Lui, F.T., 1999. Bureaucratic Corruption and Endogenous Economic Growth. The Journal of Political Economy, 107(6), Part 2: Symposium on the
Economic Analysis of Social Behavior in Honor of Becker, G.S., S270–S293.
Hall, R.E., Jones, C.I., 1999. Why do some countries produces so much more output per worker than others? The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (1),
83–116.
Hodrick, R., Prescott, E.P., 1997. Post-war business cycles: an empirical investigation. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 29, 1–16.
Jalan, J., Ravallion, M., 2002. Geographic poverty traps? A micro model of consumption growth in rural China. Journal of Applied Econometrics 17 (4),
329–346.
Kraay, A., Raddatz, C., 2007. Poverty traps, aid, and growth. Journal of Development Economics 82 (2), 315–347.
Table A.1
TFP uncertainty shocks: positive or negative signs (in parentheses) confirm the presence of extreme movements in the TFP growth rate series. A (+) is
assigned when TFP Growth Rate4μhpA þ 1:43sA and a (−) is assigned when TFP Growth Rate4μ
hp
A −1:43sA . The variable μ
hp
A represents the sample mean
of the TFP growth rate Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filtered series. Dates.
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Country Productivity Shocks
United States 1951(+), 1954(−), 1962(+), 1970(−), 1974(−), 1975(−), 1980(−), 1984(+), 2009(−)
Canada 1950(+), 1951(+), 1952(+), 1954(−), 1956(+), 1957(−), 1962(+),
1964(+), 1975(−), 1980(−), 1982(−), 1990(−), 1991(−), 2005(−), 2009(−)
France 1956(+), 1960(+), 1975(−), 1985(−), 1990(−), 1995(−), 2009(−)
Germany 1990(−), 2005(−), 2009(−)
Italy 1951(+), 1961(+), 1966(+), 1968(+), 1975(−), 1990(−)
Japan 1950(+), 1965(+), 1970(−)
United Kingdom 1965(−), 1973(+), 1975(−), 1980(−), 1986(+), 1994(+), 2009(−)
Benin 1975(−), 1979(+), 1982(+), 1983(−), 2005(−), 2008(−)
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